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The G-3/85 Second medical indication/EISAI and G-2/08 Dosage regime/ABBOTT 
RESPIRATORY cases 
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1
 and SIGRID STERCKX
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"Praetorian law ... is that which in the public interest the [judges] have introduced in aid or 
supplementation or correction of the [civil law]."
3
 
 
"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"
4
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The European Patent Convention (EPC), which governs the grant of European patents 
by the European Patent Office (EPO), forbids the grant of patents for methods of 
medical treatment. In 1984, in an attempt to find a manner in which European 
patents could be granted to those who found new medical treatments using existing 
drug compounds, the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBoA) of the EPO sanctioned a 
novel form of patent claim, the "Swiss-type use claim", under which a known process 
for producing a known drug product was considered to acquire novelty by virtue of 
the new use to which the drug product was to be put. Following the revision of the 
EPC in 2000, in a 2010 decision, the EBoA has declared that the Swiss-type use claim 
is no longer to be permitted. In this article we explore the 1984 and 2010 decisions 
and their ramifications for the many European patents already granted with Swiss-
type use claims. We conclude that the 2010 decision is both courageous and correct. 
 
Introduction 
 
European patent applications filed from 29 January 2011 and with no earlier priority 
date will no longer result in the grant of European Patents with Swiss-type use 
claims, i.e. claims of the format "Use of substance X for the manufacture of a 
medicament for use in the treatment of ailment Y". This was stipulated in the EBoA 
decision G-2/08 Dosage regime/ABBOTT RESPIRATORY
5
 from February 2010 and in a 
notice from the EPO published in its Official Journal in October 2010.
6
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 3 
The UK Patent Office acted even more quickly, stating on 26 May 2010 that Swiss-
type use claims would be objected to with immediate effect.
7
 
 
Swiss-type use claims
8
 had been accepted by the EPO since the earliest decision of 
the EBoA in December 1984, G-5/83 Second medical indication/EISAI.
9
 The "need" 
for such claims arose because of the prohibition in Art. 52(4) of the 1973 version of 
the EPC of the grant of European patents for methods of surgery, therapy or 
diagnosis.
10
 Where a drug known for one treatment was found to be useful in 
another, for example against a different disease or in a different dosage regime, the 
"invention" could not be patented as the drug per se or as a method of using the 
drug, but the expense of regulatory clearance for the new treatment would still have 
to be incurred before the drug could be supplied for use in the new treatment. 
Swiss-type use claims offered a possibility of obtaining patent protection in such 
cases. 
 
For known substances found to have a medicinal use for the first time, Art. 54(5) EPC 
1973 provided an exception to the rules of novelty, allowing purpose-limited claims 
to the substance per se. Prior to the EISAI decision, in Germany
11
 claims to a 
substance found to have a new medicinal use were allowed in the format "use of 
compound X for the treatment of ailment Y" and the Swiss Patent Office had come 
up with the Swiss-type use claim format.
12
 The EBoA, in EISAI, decided that while the 
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German format was not acceptable under the EPC,
13
 the Swiss-type use claim format 
was acceptable. 
 
In the UK, in 1985, the Patents Court, somewhat reluctantly, decided to follow the 
EISAI decision and allow Swiss-type use claims in John Wyeth's and Schering's 
Applications.
14
 
 
Problems with Swiss-type use claims 
 
The major problem with the Swiss-type use claim format was of course that the 
novelty of the claimed subject-matter derived entirely from the intended end use of 
the drug, and, the first indications of Art 54(5) EPC 1973 aside, purpose-limitation 
has generally not been considered to confer novelty on a product. Product X for use 
Y is interpreted as covering product X in a form suitable for use Y, and if the old drug 
formulation could be used in the new treatment then the Swiss-type use claim would 
seem to lack novelty. 
 
However, the claim format also poses problems when it comes to determining 
whether infringement has occurred. This may be illustrated by the drug acetyl 
salicylic acid (aspirin), which for decades has been available over the counter (i.e. not 
requiring a prescription) in tablet form as an analgesic. Recently, aspirin has been 
suggested to be useful in reducing the occurrence of cancers. In Swiss-type claim 
form, this could have been claimed as "The use of acetyl salicylic acid for the 
manufacture of a medicament for use in prophylactic treatment against cancer." 
Consider then three cases where a patient has taken aspirin tablets for this purpose: 
the first where the patient has bought the tablets over the counter in a package from 
company A labelled as for analgesic use, a packaged form that has been available 
from long before the new indication was found; the second where the tablets were 
made by company B, bought by company C in bulk and packaged as for analgesic or 
cancer prophylaxis use; and the third where the tablets were made by company D 
and packaged by the same company as for analgesic or cancer prophylaxis use. 
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In the first case, the tablets only became "for use in prophylactic treatment against 
cancer" when they were purchased and consumed by the patient. Company A has no 
control over the intentions and actions of the purchaser and clearly could not be 
held to infringe. In the second case, bulk manufacturer B again has no control over 
the actions of its customer C or the intentions of the end user - it is simply continuing 
to do something (tablet manufacture) which it may have been doing for years and 
again seems unlikely to be found to infringe. Even in the third case, since the tablets 
are packaged for two alternative uses and since actual consumption can only be for 
one of these uses, the tablets again only become "for use in prophylactic treatment 
against cancer" when they are purchased and consumed by the patient. If an action 
can only become infringement when a drug is consumed, it would seem that the 
process covered by the claim would have to be interpreted as including the act of 
consumption, which would make the process unpatentable as a method of medical 
treatment. Thus it would appear that the Swiss-type use claim is only infringed if the 
manufacturer of the tablets, at the time of manufacture, intended (all) the tablets to 
be used for the new indication. 
 
Philip Grubb has commented: 
 
"At best, a patent containing a Swiss-type claim may be used to prevent a competitor from actively 
promoting the compound for the new use, by advertisements, package inserts, etc., but it cannot 
prevent doctors from prescribing for the patented new use a generic product which is already on the 
market for an earlier indication."
15
 
 
Besides direct infringement, there may be contributory infringement of a patent 
claim, where the infringer supplies something which can be used by the recipient to 
put the invention into effect. However, since, in the case of a Swiss-type use claim, 
the "invention" claimed is the process for manufacturing the tablets, a bulk 
manufacturer such as company B cannot be guilty of contributory infringement as it 
supplies the product of the process and not a means for putting the process into 
effect. 
 
The 2000 revision of the EPC 
 
The situation concerning patent protection for second and further medical 
indications changed with the revision of the EPC in 2000,
16
 when a new clause, Art. 
54(5) EPC, was added, allowing purpose-limited product per se claims for drugs 
found to be useful in new treatments. This clause reads as follows: 
 
"[The provisions mandating novelty for claimed subject matter] shall ... not exclude the patentability of 
any substance or composition, comprised in the state of the art [i.e. not novel], for use in a method [for 
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treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or of diagnosis practised on the human or animal 
body], provided that such use is not comprised in the state of the art."
17
 
 
Interestingly, Art. 54(5) EPC was introduced at the suggestion of Switzerland.
18
 Even 
more interestingly, the submissions made by the Swiss delegation in support of the 
new clause, to the effect that it did no more than transpose into statute law the 
effects of the EISAI decision, were misleading and incorrect. This was apparently not 
picked up by the other delegates to the Munich Conference at which the adoption of 
Art. 54(5) EPC was approved. We have discussed the misleading nature of the Swiss 
submissions elsewhere.
19
 It was also discussed in an amicus curiae brief
20
 filed in 
ABBOTT RESPIRATORY, and, at length, at the EBoA oral proceedings in ABBOTT 
RESPIRATORY.
21
 Put briefly, the position regarding patent infringement by medical 
practitioners at least is worsened by the adoption of Art. 54(5) EPC. 
 
In ABBOTT RESPIRATORY, the EBoA did acknowledge that Art. 54(5) EPC went 
beyond simply codifying the result of the EISAI decision: 
 
"It appears that the rights conferred on the patentee by the claim category under Article 54(5) EPC are likely 
broader, and could, in particular, lead to possible restrictions on the freedom of medical practitioners to prescribe 
or administer generics."
22
 
 
More to the point, however, in ABBOTT RESPIRATORY the EBoA decided that Swiss-
type use claims were no longer necessary, and should no longer be allowed, in view 
of the adoption of Art. 54(5) EPC: 
 
"Article 54(5) EPC now permits purpose-related product protection for any further specific use of a known 
medicament in a method of therapy. Therefore ... the loophole existing in the provisions of the EPC 1973 [whereby 
there was no clear basis in the EPC for allowing patent protection for drugs found to have a second (or further) 
medical use] was closed. 
 
In other words "cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex", when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. 
 
The cause of the praetorian approach ceasing, the effect must cease."
23
 
 
Nonetheless, in the revision of the EPC in 2000, no amendment was made which 
specifically accorded or denied patentability to Swiss-type use claims. 
 
In patent law in general, the applicant is free to define her invention as she wishes. 
The claim chosen is examined for patent-eligibility under Art 52(2) and Art 53 EPC, 
and then for novelty, inventive step, susceptibility to industrial application, 
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 7 
sufficiency of disclosure, and clarity. Apart from the addition of Art. 54(5) EPC, these 
gate-keepers to the patentability of further medical indication inventions were 
essentially unchanged in the 2000 revision. Why then should an applicant no longer 
be free to use Swiss-type use claims? The key, we feel, is to be found in the EBoA's 
references to "praetorian" law in the ABBOTT RESPIRATORY decision. 
 
As is clear from the opening quote of this article, praetorian law is judicially-made 
law and can go beyond the simple "interpretation" of the statute law which courts 
are required to do. The EPC, however, is an international treaty for which 
amendment to the definitions of what is and is not patentable requires ratification 
by all the member states (as was done with EPC 2000). The following questions thus 
arise: (i) did the EBoA, in EISAI, extend the scope of the subject-matter for which 
European patents could be granted beyond the scope permitted by EPC 1973? (ii) if 
it did not, then why are Swiss-type use claims no longer to be permitted? (iii) if it did, 
then are the European patents which have been granted with Swiss-type use claims 
invalid? and finally (iv) are the days of the much-reviled Mobil use claim
24
 also 
numbered? 
 
Before commenting on these issues, we must draw attention to the breathing space 
that EPO Boards of Appeal have to create new law. First, we must quote Paul Van 
den Berg, the erstwhile chairman of EPO Technical Board of Appeal (TBoA) 3.5.1 and 
for a long time a member of the EBoA: 
 
"[EPO] boards of appeal cannot assume the role of legislator. They have to apply the law as it stands 
and cannot strive to meet wishes which are incompatible with the provisions of the European Patent 
Convention."
25
 
 
Further, we would draw attention to the powers of the Boards of Appeal to 
"interpret" the EPC as set out in the EPC: 
 
"In their decisions the members of the Boards ... shall comply ... with the provisions of the [EPC]."
26
 
 
Finally we would refer to the minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference of 1973, 
the conference at which the wording of EPC 1973 was agreed, and in particular to 
two comments relating to Art. 54(5) EPC 1973, the clause which permitted purpose-
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limited claims to a known compound which has been found for the first time to have 
a medicinal use: 
 
"The Netherlands delegation proposed that the wording of [Art. 54(5) EPC 1973] ... should be 
improved. It said that on no account did it wish, with its proposal, to break away from the principle that 
only the first application of the use of a known substance or composition in a method for treatment of 
the human or animal body by surgery or therapy is patentable, and not the second and subsequent 
applications. ... 
 
The Chairman replied to the Yugoslav delegation and said that, in his opinion, the aim in [Art. 54(5) EPC 
1973] was to make it clear that a known substance (or a known composition) which, since it formed 
part of the state of the art, was no longer patentable, nevertheless could be patented for the first use 
in a method for the treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy; however, a further 
patent could not be granted if a second possible use were found for the same substance, irrespective of 
whether the human or animal body was to be treated with it. ... The Chairman noted that his views 
were shared by the Government delegations"
27
 
 
From this, it seems clear that the intention of the legislators of EPC 1973, unlike that 
of the legislators of EPC 2000, was to provide a loophole (to the exclusion from 
patentability of inventions which were methods of medical treatment) only for 
compounds found for the first time to have a medicinal use. EISAI went against this 
intention by allowing claims (Swiss-type use claims) to second and subsequent 
indications. 
 
For answers to the four questions we posed above, we must turn to the texts of the 
EISAI and ABBOTT RESPIRATORY decisions. 
 
The EISAI Decision 
 
In EISAI, the justification given for accepting Swiss-type use claims was as follows: 
 
"As is rightly recognised ... Article 52(1) EPC [1973] expresses a general principle of patentability for inventions 
which are industrially applicable, new and inventive and it is clear that in all fields of industrial activity other than 
those of making products for use in surgery, therapy and diagnostic methods, a new use for a known product can be 
fully protected as such by claims directed to that use. 
 
This is in fact the appropriate form of protection in such cases as the new and non-obvious use of the known 
product constitutes the invention and it is the clear intention of the European Patent Convention that a patent be 
granted for the invention to which a European patent application relates ... Article 54(5) EPC [1973] provides an 
exception to this general rule, however, so far as the first use of medicaments is concerned, in respect of which the 
normal type of use claim is prohibited by Art. 52(4) EPC [1973]. In effect, in this case the required novelty for the 
medicament which forms the subject-matter of the claim is derived from the new pharmaceutical use."
28
 
 
Thus far, nothing much new or groundbreaking: where an invention resides in a new 
use for a known thing, that invention can be claimed as a method ("A method of 
doing new thing X using known thing Y"). Where the method is a medical treatment 
with a drug, however, such claims are not allowed and an alternative claim format is 
required. Where the drug is new, the claim can be to the drug as such. Where the 
drug is a known substance, but not a substance known to have medicinal properties, 
                                                 
27
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Art. 54(5) EPC 1973 provided a special exception, allowing the alternative format to 
be a purpose-limited product claim. 
 
Art. 54(5) EPC 1973 states that the provisions of the rest of the Article, which say 
that an invention will be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of 
the art, "shall not exclude the patentability of any substance or composition, 
comprised in the state of the art, for use in a method [of treatment] ... provided that 
its use for any method [of treatment] ... is not comprised in the state of the art." 
Since the drug compound as such is comprised in the state of the art, the first 
indication invention (Compound Y for use in medicine) is novel because "for use in 
medicine" provides novelty, i.e. in some way distinguishes over the drug as such and 
in some way is limitative. Art. 54(5) EPC 1973 thus provided a special exception to 
the general rule that a purpose limitation does not provide novelty over a known 
product in a form suitable for that purpose - the special exception however was 
relatively limited for, as a matter of fact, medicines do have to be made under 
special conditions and a compound that is known, but not known to have any 
medicinal use, would rarely be in a form suitable for use as a medicine. The same 
logic would not apply to a second or further medical indication, as the drug would 
very likely form part of the state of the art in a form suitable for the new use. 
 
The EISAI Board continued: 
 
"It seems justifiable by analogy to derive the novelty for the process which forms the subject-matter of the type of 
use claim now being considered from the new therapeutic use of the medicament and this irrespective of the fact 
whether any pharmaceutical use of the medicament was already known or not."
29
 
 
The analogy however is not so direct. In the Swiss-type use claim, which is directed 
to a process for preparing a product, the invention as claimed is a process but the 
purpose limitation is not on the process (the subject-matter of the claim) but on the 
product. The process claimed may be identical to a known process in all process 
aspects. In other words, strictly speaking, the invention forms part of the state of the 
art and therefore lacks novelty according to Art. 54 EPC 1973. The EISAI Board itself 
does mention in relation to Swiss-type use claims that "there may be a problem 
concerning the novelty of the invention."
30
 The UK Patents Court, in John Wyeth's 
and Schering's Applications, felt similarly: 
 
"there can be no objections to the patenting in the Swiss form of claim of an invention directed to a second or 
subsequent medical use of a known pharmaceutical if the statutory requirement of novelty can be met. 
 
However, that stated, had the matter to be considered on the wording of sections 1 to 4 of the UK statute (the 1977 
Act) and without regard to the position, as it has developed, under the corresponding provisions of [EPC 1973], we 
think the better view would be that a claim in the Swiss form to an invention directed to the use of a known 
pharmaceutical to manufacture a medicament, not in itself novel, for a second or subsequent and novel medical use 
would not be patentable as lacking the required novelty. It has to be recognised that it would have been a simple 
matter to provide for the patenting of such an invention directed to a second medical use by the omission of the 
word "any" in section 2(6) [i.e. the section corresponding to Art. 54(5) EPC 1973], if it had been the intention of the 
legislature that a novel second or further use of a known pharmaceutical should be patentable."
31
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The UK Patents Court then reviewed the EISAI approach to the novelty of Swiss-type 
use claims and concluded that: 
 
"[the EBoA’s] approach to the novelty of the Swiss type of use claim directed to a second, or subsequent, 
therapeutic use is equally possible under the corresponding provisions of the [UK] 1977 Act and, notwithstanding 
the opinion expressed earlier [i.e. the opinion quoted immediately above in this article] as to the better view of the 
patentability of such a Swiss type claim under the material provisions of the [UK 1977] Act considered without 
regard to the position, as it has developed, under the corresponding provisions of the [EPC 1973], having regard to 
the desirability of achieving conformity, the same approach should be adopted to the novelty of the Swiss type of 
claim now under consideration under the material provisions of the [1977 UK] Act."
32
 
 
Put differently, the EBoA was wrong, but for the sake of uniformity its decision must 
be followed, at least until it is overturned by a higher court or by the EBoA itself. 
 
Turning back to EISAI, the EBoA commented on the exclusion from patentability of 
methods of medical treatment and, reassuring itself that its view was also held by 
the German Federal Supreme Court, stated that: "The intention of Article 52(4) EPC 
[1973 - now replaced by its equivalent Art. 53(c) EPC] is only to free from restraint 
non-commercial and non-industrial medical and veterinary activities."
33
 
 
Since medical practitioners may be involved in commercial activity and so be 
constrained by patents, for example on surgical devices or covering generic 
substitution,
34
 this seems an all too convenient interpretation of the legislators' 
intention. Had the legislators' intention actually been to free medical practitioners 
from constraint by patents it would have been simple to add to the EPC an Article 
specifying that no act by a medical practitioner in the performance of her 
professional duties could constitute patent infringement. Instead, the EPC seems 
simply to have enshrined the earlier practice of the member states of just not 
allowing patents for methods of medical treatment.
35
 Nonetheless, if the EISAI 
Board's interpretation is accepted, then it might have been expected that the EBoA 
would avoid expanding the range of patentable subject-matter the patenting of 
which could further add to the restraints on such practitioners. 
 
The EISAI Board minimised the reach of the exclusion: "To prevent the exclusion 
from going beyond its proper limits, it seems appropriate to take a special view of 
the concept of the "state of the art" ... Article 54(5) EPC [1973] alone provides only a 
partial compensation for the restriction on patent rights in the industrial and 
commercial field resulting from [the exclusion]."
36
 
 
At the Munich Diplomatic Conference in 1973, the French and German delegations 
had made it abundantly clear
37
 that the scope of what was or was not patentable 
subject matter was too important to be left to the EPO's Administrative Council to 
decide, in other words it was only for the EPC Member States to agree that scope.  
                                                 
32
 Ibid., at 567. 
33
 EISAI, supra note 9, at 66. 
34
 SIGRID STERCKX and JULIAN COCKBAIN, supra note 19. 
35
 See JUSTINE PILA, The Requirement for an Invention in Patent Law, 138 (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2010). 
36
 EISAI, supra note 9, at 66. 
37
 GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, supra note 27, at 28. 
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One wonders whether the delegations would have been comfortable with the scope 
of the patentable being broadened by the EBoA. 
 
The EISAI Board then left credibility behind: 
 
"It should be added that the Enlarged Board does not deduce from the special provision of Article 54(5) EPC [1973] 
that there was any intention to exclude second (and further) medical indications from patent protection other than 
by a purpose-limited product claim. The rule of interpretation that if one thing is expressed the alternative is 
excluded ..., is a rule to be applied with very great caution as it can lead to injustice. No intention to exclude second 
(and further) medical indications can be deduced from the terms of the European Patent Convention: nor can it be 
deduced from the legislative history of the articles in question."
38
 
 
As mentioned above, at the Munich Diplomatic Conference in 1973, the delegates 
had clearly taken a different position: 
 
"The Netherlands ... said that on no account did it wish, with its proposal, to break away from the 
principle that only the first application of the use of a known substance or composition in a method for 
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy is patentable, and not the second and 
subsequent applications. ... 
 
"The Chairman ... said that, in his opinion, the aim in [Art. 54(5) EPC 1973] was to make it clear that a 
known substance (or a known composition) which, since it formed part of the state of the art, was no 
longer patentable, nevertheless could be patented for the first use in a method for the treatment of 
the human or animal body by surgery or therapy; however, a further patent could not be granted if a 
second possible use were found for the same substance, irrespective of whether the human or animal 
body was to be treated with it. ... The Chairman noted that his views were shared by the Government 
delegations"
39
 
 
 
The EISAI Board then approved the use of Swiss-type use claims, i.e. found that 
purpose limitation could render an otherwise anticipated claim novel. This was 
praetorian law, i.e. the EBoA deciding that it was entitled to supplement or correct 
the EPC. 
 
Interestingly, Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.4, in a decision in June 1994, rejected a 
process claim in the form "A process for the manufacture of a medicament for use in 
treatment X comprising mixing Y with a carrier and/or diluent" as lacking novelty 
while at the same time accepting that under EISAI the equivalent Swiss-type use 
claim ("Use of Y for the manufacture of a medicament for use in treatment X") was 
novel. Since the use claim is a process claim, this decision would seem bizarre 
without the following justification given by the Board: 
 
"[T]he novelty of the intended use of the product can only be taken into account as a technical feature limiting the 
claim where the claim takes the form of a use claim as approved of in decision G 5/83".
40
 
                                                 
38
 EISAI, supra note 9, at 66. 
39
 GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, supra note 27, at 29. 
40
 T-51/93 HCG/SERONO (1994), available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/pdf/t930051eu1.pdf [last checked 15 December 2010], at 7. Technical Board of 
Appeal 3.3.2 disagreed, however, and considered that formulation of a claim explicitly as a 
process was equally acceptable as formulation as a Swiss-type use. See: T-958/94 Anti-
tumoral agent/THERAPEUTIQUES SUBSTITUIVES, OJ EPO 241-250 (1997); and T-853/94 
Benanomicin A/ZAIDAIN (1998) available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/pdf/t940853eu1.pdf [last checked 15 December 2010]. This disagreement 
between the two Boards on second indication claims is reflected in the ABBOTT 
RESPIRATORY case which resulted from the disagreement on dosage regime claims 
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This seems to be a statement that the Swiss-type use claim is in a category apart 
from other process claims, one to which the normal rules of novelty do not apply, i.e. 
that EISAI represented praetorian law which the Technical Board of Appeal was 
bound to follow.
 
 
 
The answer to the first of the questions posed above whether the EBoA, in EISAI, 
extended the scope of the subject-matter for which European patents could be 
granted beyond the scope permitted by EPC 1973 is clearly yes. This is confirmed 
by the ABBOTT RESPIRATORY Board's references, discussed below, to EISAI as 
representing praetorian law. The second question, as to why Swiss-type use claims 
should no longer to be permitted, is thus redundant.  
 
The ABBOTT RESPIRATORY decision 
 
In ABBOTT RESPIRATORY, the EBoA revisited the topic of the Swiss-type use claims 
and argued as follows: 
 
"It has been established practice under the EPC 1973 that a patent related to a further medical indication of a 
known medicament could only be granted for a claim directed to the use of a substance or composition for the 
manufacture of a medicament for a specified therapeutic application ... 
 
Since the medicament per se was not new the subject-matter of such a claim was rendered novel by its therapeutic 
application ... This praetorian approach was a "special approach to the derivation of novelty" ... and therefore 
constituted a narrow exception to the principles governing the novelty requirements which was not intended to be 
applied in other fields of technology".
41
 
 
Sadly, the EBoA's special approach to the derivation of novelty had become more 
broadly applied outside the field of medicine in G-2/88 Friction-reducing 
additive/MOBIL III, a decision that has been widely criticised. We should note 
however that this "special approach to the derivation of novelty", an approach under 
which something that lacks novelty under the normal approach, and hence would be 
unpatentable, is deemed novel and patentable, is described by the ABBOTT 
RESPIRATORY Board as a praetorian approach, i.e. one which goes beyond the law as 
agreed by the EPC 1973 legislators. This appears to be a clear admission that EISAI's 
acceptance of Swiss-type use claims was bad law which should be followed no 
longer. The ABBOTT RESPIRATORY Board proceeded first to explain how the 
"praetorian" approach had come about, before explicitly stating that it no longer had 
its place in European patent law: 
 
"That praetorian ruling found its cause in the fact that a claim directed to the use of the substance or composition 
for the treatment of the human body by therapy had to be regarded as a step of treatment ... A claim of that kind 
was forbidden. On the other hand only the first medical indication of a known composition in the form of a 
medicament was by virtue of Article 54(5) EPC 1973 (Article 54(4) EPC 2000) entitled to be drafted in the form of a 
purpose-related product claim. And since the intention of the legislator was clearly not to exclude second 
therapeutic indications of a known medicament from the field of patentability the so-called Swiss-type claim 
constituted the adequate but exceptional solution. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
between decisions from the same two Boards, with Board 3.3.4 in that instance being more 
generous than Board 3.3.2. 
41
 ABBOTT RESPIRATORY, supra note 5, at 491 (emphasis added). 
 13 
Article 54(5) EPC now permits purpose-related product protection for any further specific use of a known 
medicament in a method of therapy. Therefore, as mentioned in the preparatory document (MR/24/00, point 139)
42
 
the loophole existing in the provisions of EPC 1973 was closed. 
 
In other words "cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex", when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. 
 
The cause of the praetorian approach ceasing, the effect must cease. ...".
43
 
 
Note, however, that the ABBOTT RESPIRATORY Board merely repeated the EISAI 
Board's incorrect statement that "the intention of the legislator was clearly not to 
exclude second therapeutic indications of a known medicament from the field of 
patentability", without this time stating that it had studied the travaux 
préparatoires. 
 
The Mobil use claims 
 
According to the EBoA in MOBIL III, Mobil use claims are not process claims (unlike 
Swiss-type use claims. Hence, they must be purpose-limited product claims. They 
have to be one or the other after all, since inventions can only be claimed as 
products or processes. 
 
This little piece of "Byzantine logic" is explained, if that is an appropriate word for it, 
in MOBIL III. 
 
"The recognition or discovery of a previously unknown property of a known compound, such property providing a 
new technical effect, can clearly involve a valuable and inventive contribution to the art. 
 
In countries such as Germany, such inventions have for many years commonly been sought to be protected by "use" 
claims".
44
 
 
Thus far, nothing problematic for the EPC. The MOBIL III Board then commented on 
the purpose and features of the patent claims: 
 
"The purpose of claims under the EPC is to enable the protection conferred by the patent ... to be determined ... 
 
It follows that the technical features of the invention are the physical features which are essential to it".
45
 
 
Again, so far, so good. Then the Board stated that for process claims "the technical 
features of a claim ... are the physical steps which define such activity [i.e. the 
process]"  and that for product claims "the technical features of a claim to a physical 
entity are the physical parameters of the entity".
46
 
 
The conclusion from this is mind-blowing: 
 
                                                 
42
 EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Conference of the Contracting States to Revise the 1973 
European Patent Convention - Munich, 20 to 29 November 2000 - Conference Proceedings, 
71, MR/24/00 e (European Patent Office, Munich 2003). 
43
 ABBOTT RESPIRATORY, supra note 5, at 491-492 (footnote and emphasis added). 
44
 MOBIL III, supra note 24, at 99. That "use", "process", and "method" claims are all of the 
same type was confirmed by the EBoA in MOBIL III. Ibid., at 98-99. 
45
 Ibid., at 100. 
46
 Ibid., at 100. 
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"It ... follows that a claim to a particular use of a compound is in effect a claim to the physical entity (the compound) 
only when it is being used in the course of the particular physical activity (the use), this being an additional technical 
feature of the claim".
47 
 
"Thus, provided that a use claim in reality defines the use of a particular physical entity to achieve an "effect", and 
does not define such a use to produce a "product", the use claim is not a process claim".
48
 
 
This little piece of Byzantine logic is fatally flawed as can be seen if it is applied to the 
second medical indication of a known drug, e.g. aspirin to achieve a prophylactic 
effect against cancer. Expressed in a Mobil use claim form (rather than as a Swiss-
type use claim), the "use" claim would read "Use of aspirin to achieve a prophylactic 
effect against cancer". The EISAI Board had, reluctantly, accepted that this was a 
claim to a method of medical treatment, and thus unpatentable. Even if the logic of 
MOBIL III is followed and this is read as a product claim, i.e. "Aspirin for use to 
achieve a prophylactic effect against cancer", the position of the claim does not 
improve - this claim format was explicitly rejected in the travaux préparatoires as 
quoted above. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus if the EBoA decides that something previously thought to be patentable is not, 
do the owners of patents or applicants for patents claiming such subject-matter have 
a "legitimate expectation" that their patents be held to be valid or that their 
applications be granted, despite the new decision? Normally, one would expect not - 
it is the interests of the public that must be guarded against the grant of 
unwarranted monopolies and not the interests of the investors and patentees who 
may have benefited for many years from an unjustified monopoly. Monopolies are 
an exception to business practice in Europe and one which requires justification to 
the public which, as a result of such monopolies, must pay prices for goods and 
services which are higher than those which might apply were there to be free and 
open competition. In a decision in December 2010, in G-1/08 Tomato/ISRAEL, the 
EBoA addressed this very point: 
 
"There can be no "legitimate expectation" that an interpretation of a substantive provision governing patentability 
given in a decision of the boards of appeal will not be overruled in the future by the Enlarged Board of Appeal, since 
recognising such an expectation as legitimate would undermine the function of the Enlarged Board of Appeal".
49
 
 
It seems therefore that European patent claims which derive their novelty from 
purpose limitations, when subject-matter suitable for that purpose was known, 
might be invalid. The answer to the third question posed above, whether European 
patents which have been granted with Swiss-type use claims are invalid, seems to be 
yes. 
 
Finally, to answer the fourth question, regarding the status of the Mobil use claim: if 
the EBoA's extension of the scope of what was patentable under EISAI was 
                                                 
47
 Ibid., at 104. 
48
 Ibid., at 105. 
49
 G-1/08 Tomato/ISRAEL (2010), available at  
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/E72204692CFE1DC3C12577F4004B
EA42/$File/G1_08_en.pdf  [last checked 9 December 2010], at 32. 
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praetorian law, i.e. an action going beyond the powers of the EBoA, then so too was 
the MOBIL III decision. Few will regret its demise if our analysis is correct. 
 
With a refreshing willingness to revisit its earliest decision, in ABBOTT RESPIRATORY 
the EBoA has laid to rest a claim format which should probably never have been 
permitted. Unlike the EISAI decision, the ABBOTT RESPIRATORY decision honours the 
law agreed to by the legislators. By recognising that Swiss-type use claims arose out 
of praetorian law, “the cause of [which] ceasing, the effect must cease”,
50
 the EBoA 
has courageously wiped its own slate clean. 
                                                 
50
 ABBOTT RESPIRATORY, supra note 5, at 492. 
